EASA ED Decision 2017/015R – CS-25 Amendment 19

Amending Certification Specifications and Acceptable Means of Compliance for Large Aeroplanes.

This Decision amends CS-25 as follows:

  • Amendment of CS 25.571 and Appendix H, and creation of a new AMC 25.571, in order to upgrade damage tolerance and fatigue evaluation of structure and ensure that the safety risks associated with the ‘ageing aircraft’ issues are mitigated (RMT.0225).
  • Amendment of several paragraphs in Subparts D and F and creation of a new Appendix S for ‘Low-occupancy aeroplanes’ and ‘non-commercially operated aeroplanes’ (commonly called ‘private-use aeroplanes’), along with new or amended AMC. In addition, new and amended CS-25 requirements are provided, which were found to be fully applicable to any kind of transport category aeroplanes certified under CS-25 regardless of the type of interior arrangement or operation (RMT.0264).
  • Amendment of CS 25.1309 and AMC 25.1309 in order to:
    •  clarify the interfaces between CS 25.1309 and CS 25.810/CS 25.812; and
    •  reflect the current aircraft development practices that make use of the assignment of development assurance levels (DALs).

Overall this amendment of CS-25 is expected to increase safety, reflect the available state of the art and acceptable means of compliance, facilitate the certification process, and improve harmonisation with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). It is expected that this amendment will create no social or environmental impacts, and no significant economic impact, except for ‘private-use aeroplanes’ where a significantly positive economic impact is expected.

FAA AC 120-102A Chg 1 Incorporation of Electrical Wiring Interconnection Systems Instructions for Continued Airworthiness into an Operator’s Maintenance Program

On November 8, 2007, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) published the Enhanced Airworthiness Program for Airplane Systems/Fuel Tank Safety (EAPAS/FTS) final rule. The intent of the rule is to help ensure the continued safety of commercial airplanes by improving the design, installation, and maintenance of electrical wiring systems. Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 121, § 121.1111, and part 129, § 129.111 include requirements for operators to revise their maintenance programs to include instructions for continued airworthiness (ICA), which include inspections and procedures for the electrical wiring interconnection systems (EWIS). This advisory circular (AC) only addresses the EWIS requirements and provides guidance accordingly. The current edition of AC 120-97, Incorporation of Fuel Tank System Instructions for Continued Airworthiness into Operator Maintenance or Inspection Programs, provides guidance for operators to comply with the fuel tank safety (FTS) requirements in the EAPAS/FTS rule.

This advisory circular (AC) provides guidance for Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 121 certificate holders and 14 CFR part 129 operators (part 129, § 129.14) of U.S.-registered airplanes (hereafter both are referred to as “operators”) regarding compliance with the Enhanced Airworthiness Program for Airplane Systems/Fuel Tank Safety (EAPAS/FTS) Rule

FAA AC 120-98A – Operator Information for Incorporating Fuel Tank Flammability Reduction Requirements into a Maintenance or Inspection Program (Including Change 1)

This advisory circular (AC) provides information and describes an acceptable means of compliance (AMC) with the Reduction of Fuel Tank Flammability in Transport Category Airplanes, final rule. It is commonly called the Fuel Tank Flammability Reduction (FTFR) rule. This AC describes acceptable means, but not the only means, for demonstrating compliance with the applicable regulations. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will consider other methods of demonstrating compliance that an applicant may elect to present. While these guidelines are not mandatory, they are derived from extensive FAA and industry experience in determining compliance with the relevant regulations. If the FAA becomes aware of circumstances that convince us that following this AC would not result in compliance with the applicable regulations, the FAA may require additional substantiation or design changes as a basis for finding compliance. This material does not change or create any additional regulatory requirements, nor does it authorize changes in or permit deviations from existing regulatory requirements.

FAA AC 120-97A – Incorporation of Fuel Tank System Instructions for Continued Airworthiness into Operator Maintenance or Inspection Programs (Including Change 1)

On May 7, 2001, the Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review, Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements final rule was published in the Federal Register (FR). It has since been referred to as the 2001 Fuel Tank Safety (FTS) rule. It adopted amendments to part 25, Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88 and operating requirements related to SFAR 88. The operating requirements included requirements to implement instructions for continued airworthiness (ICA) that design approval holders (DAH) developed in compliance with SFAR 88. On November 8, 2007, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) published the Enhanced Airworthiness Program for Airplane Systems (EAPAS)/FTS final rule. The purpose of the rule is to help ensure the continued safety of transport category airplanes by improving the design, installation, and maintenance of electrical wiring systems. The EAPAS/FTS rule amended the operating requirements to implement FTS actions developed in accordance with SFAR 88. Integrating the incorporation of the fuel tank system and electrical wiring interconnection system (EWIS) requirements helps to ensure compatibility and to eliminate duplication. Additionally, the EAPAS/FTS rule redesignates (replaces) Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 91, § 91.410(b); part 121, § 121.370(b); part 125, § 125.248(b); and part 129, § 129.32(b) of the FTS rule. The new sections are §§ 91.1507, 121.1113, 125.507 and 129.113. These new rules also clarify language with reference to the approval process of the operator’s program. This advisory circular (AC) only addresses the fuel tank system safety requirements and describes acceptable means of compliance (AMC) accordingly. The current edition of AC 120-102, Incorporation of Electrical Wiring Interconnection Systems Instructions for Continued Airworthiness into an Operator’s Maintenance Program, addresses EWIS requirements in the EAPAS/FTS rule.

FAA Order 8040.4B – Safety Risk Management Policy

This order supports Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Order 8000.369, Safety Management System, and establishes requirements for how to conduct Safety Risk Management (SRM) in the FAA. It formalizes SRM guidance for FAA Lines ofBusiness (LOBs) and Staff Offices, and describes specific steps when performing and documenting SRM. The FAA’s mission is to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world. In support ofthis mission, the FAA uses a Safety Management System (SMS) to integrate the management ofsafety risk into operations, acquisitions, rulemaking, and decision making. The SMS enhances the safety ofthe flying public and strengthens the FAA’s worldwide leadership in aviation safety. The SMS consists offour components: Safety Policy, SRM, Safety Assurance, and Safety Promotion. The objective ofSRM is to provide information regarding hazards, safety risk, and safety risk· controls/mitigations to decision makers and to enhance the FAA’s ability to address safety risk in the aerospace system. SRM consists of conducting a system analysis; identifying hazards; and analyzing, assessing, and controlling safety risk associated with the identified hazards. SRM as described in this order outlines standardized principles that enhance the FAA’s ability to coordinate risk-based decision making across organizations. Safety Policy and Safety Promotion are not addressed in this order, but are discussed in detail in FAA Order 8000.369, Safety Management System. However, Safety Assurance is described in this order due to its importance in triggering SRM through the identification ofpotential hazards or ineffective safety risk controls, as well as its role in monitoring safety risk controls. All four components work together to enable the FAA to manage safety within the aerospace system.